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IN THE FIRST weeks of 2008, the Supreme Courtturned back a constitutional challenge to the con-
trolling influence party leaders exerted over nomi-
nations for elective judicial office in New York
State. New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez
Torres found nothing unconstitutional in selecting
candidates in “‘smoke-filled rooms’ . . . dominat[ed]
by party leaders.”1
The Justices said so just as national attention was
turning to the critical role Democratic superdele-
gates were playing in the selection of the Democ-
ratic presidential nominee. These party leaders
found themselves vested with controlling power to
select their party’s nominee independent of or even
counter to the will of the party’s rank and file. This
power was widely seen as ill-advised and even ille-
gitimate,2 and was why the superdelegates came to
be understood as an embodiment of the smoke-filled
room.3
The superdelegates, to be sure, exercised back-
room decisionmaking of a nontraditional sort. They
made their decisions well before the Denver con-
vention, and did so as individuals, not as a collec-
tive body assembled in a single room, smoky or oth-
erwise. Many superdelegates, moreover, explicitly
based their decisions on the views expressed by the
party’s rank and file. Still, no party rule compelled
the superdelegates to do so, and, in fact, the party
created these “unpledged delegates” so they could
rally against popular candidates they deemed un-
likely to prevail in the general election.4 When this
power emerged as decisive for the first time in 2008,
the superdelegates came to be seen as occupants of
a smoke-filled room. The image was apt, for it is
this power, rather than location or atmosphere, that
provides the defining characteristic of the smoke-
filled room.
This article compares the nomination process em-
ployed by the Democratic Party to select its presi-
dential nominee with the one the Supreme Court up-
held in the Lopez Torres decision. Specifically, it
compares the nomination process Barack Obama
traversed en route to the presidency with the pro-
cess New Yorker Margarita Lopez Torres con-
fronted when she sought her party’s nomination to
become a trial judge in Brooklyn.
These processes were, of course, vastly different
in scale and public salience. Obama’s presidential
bid captured worldwide attention, while Lopez Tor-
res’s candidacy was barely noticed, garnering just a
few isolated articles in the local press. Obama,
moreover, was an unusually talented candidate, who
ran a high profile, well-funded campaign that
elicited passionate support and generated tremen-
dous turnout. Lopez Torres meanwhile struggled
with limited funds and voter apathy.
Hindsight, however, can be misleading. When
Obama embarked on his quest for the presidency,
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mocrats Face Backlash, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 20,
2008; Lopez Torres and the Democrats, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 12,
2008; Ari Emanuel, My Brother the Superdelegate and Why I
Don’t Trust Him to Pick the Next President, The Huffington
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Democrats’ Super Disaster, WALL ST. JOURNAL, (March 24,
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3 See, e.g., Olson, supra note 2; Yoo, supra note 2.
4 See JULES WITCOVER, PARTY OF THE PEOPLE 619–20 (2003).
he resembled Lopez Torres in nontrivial ways. Both
were underdog candidates with credible credentials
for the office they sought. Obama was a first term
sitting senator who had sparked national interest but
was not yet a household name; Lopez Torres was
an able civil court judge who had been elected with
substantial public support. Both candidates also
shared the distinction of having annoyed the lead-
ers of their party: Obama with his brash refusal to
delay his bid, and Lopez Torres for refusing to make
patronage hires in her civil court chambers.
What makes the comparison most appropriate,
however, is that both candidates traversed complex
nomination processes that were curiously similar in
structure. Both systems relied on decentralized
state-run primaries to select delegates to attend
party-run conventions that chose the party’s nomi-
nee. And in both regimes, party leaders enjoyed dis-
cretionary power to determine the nominee regard-
less of the views of the party’s rank and file.
Operating within these regimes, Obama was able
to mount a credible—and ultimately successful—
challenge to the leadership’s choice for the nomi-
nation while Lopez Torres could not. This article
offers an explanation why. It argues that Obama suc-
ceeded where Lopez Torres failed because the nom-
ination process Obama traversed was more pene-
trable and more contestable than the one Lopez
Torres faced.
In particular, the structural hurdles Obama con-
fronted in pursuing his candidacy—from gaining ac-
cess to the ballot in every state to his ability to lobby
superdelegates attending the convention—were rela-
tively and in certain respects absolutely less onerous
than the ones Lopez Torres needed to navigate.
Obama, moreover, faced a competitive general elec-
tion once he secured his party’s nomination. The nom-
inee in the process Lopez Topez traversed did not.
Because the nomination process Obama faced
was more penetrable and more contestable than the
one Lopez Torres confronted, the superdelegates
were forced to take Obama’s candidacy seriously
and they were held accountable for their decisions.
Lopez Torres, by contrast, was unable to compel se-
rious consideration of her candidacy. Party leaders
ignored her with impunity.
The differences between the two nominating sys-
tems, however, do more than explain the success of
one candidate and the failure of another. They also
suggest that the Supreme Court may have been too
hasty in dismissing the constitutional challenge to
New York State’s judicial nomination system.
While the Justices were quite right that a nomina-
tion process that relies on a smoke-filled room is
not inherently suspect or even ill-advised, this base-
line legitimacy should not have precluded further
judicial inquiry. All smoke-filled rooms are not the
same, and nomination processes may employ them
to very different effect.
The Court in Lopez Torres feared it would be un-
able to distinguish the good from the bad in nomi-
nating processes that rely on backroom decision-
making. But the differences between the process
Obama traversed and the one Lopez Torres con-
fronted are both discernible and capable of facili-
tating structured judicial review. Penetrability and
contestability matter not because either is constitu-
tionally required, but rather because a nominating
system in which both are either wholly absent or in
combination insufficiently robust may suffer from
defects of constitutional dimension. Examining the
degree to which a nominating process possesses
these characteristics is an examination in which
courts can and should engage.
The Justices may well disagree, but Lopez Tor-
res is hardly proof that they do. Instead, the deci-
sion appears to have been animated by a distinct
concern. Specifically, the Justices worried New
York would replace the nominating system the
lower courts invalidated with something much
worse. The Court has never much liked judicial elec-
tions,5 and vindicating the complaint in Lopez Tor-
res promised—though hardly guaranteed6—New
York would replace its “sham” judicial elections
with real ones. Whatever the Justices made of the
hard fought contest between Senators Obama and
Clinton, they had no desire to see it replicated where
judicial offices were at stake. Fine for the presi-
dency, perhaps, but for judges, any smoke-filled
room was to be preferred.
TWO NOMINATING PROCEDURES
Margarita Lopez Torres first decided to seek her
party’s nomination to be a state supreme court jus-
tice in New York’s Second Judicial District in
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5 See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765,
787–88 (2002); see also id. at 788–792 (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring).
6 See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
1997.7 A decade later, Illinois Senator Barack
Obama announced he would be seeking the Demo-
cratic Party’s nomination for the presidency.
Securing the nomination to these very different
offices required each candidate to traverse nomina-
tion processes that looked similar in important re-
spects. Both candidates needed to secure the elec-
tion of loyal regional delegates to attend a
centralized party-run convention at which the dele-
gates would select them to be their party’s candi-
date. Both, moreover, needed the support of the
party’s leadership to prevail. Differences in detail
between these processes, however, reveal why
Obama succeeded and Lopez Torres failed.
Ballot access
Every state and territory issues rules governing
how a candidate’s name comes to appear on a pri-
mary or general election ballot. Obama needed to
navigate more than fifty different sets of ballot ac-
cess rules to make sure voters could choose dele-
gates pledged to him. Lopez Torres confronted a sin-
gle regime, albeit one that in many ways presented
more onerous hurdles than any Obama confronted.
One way for Judge Lopez Torres to pursue the
Democratic nomination for state supreme court jus-
tice was to assemble a slate of loyal delegates to run
in the primary election. If elected, such delegates
would attend the subsequent convention and cast
their votes for her. Under New York law, such del-
egates run from each of the assembly districts that
comprise a judicial district. In New York’s Second
Judicial District, 124 delegates and an equal num-
ber of alternates are elected from the district’s 24
component assembly districts.8
To be placed on the primary ballot, candidates for
delegate must circulate designating petitions within
the assembly district in which they are running.
State law gives them 37 days to gather 500 valid
signatures from party members who both reside in
that assembly district and who have not already
signed another such petition. Because these re-
quirements routinely render many obtained signa-
tures invalid, those seeking access to the ballot must,
as a matter of practice, obtain between one thousand
and fifteen hundred signatures to ensure obtaining
the required number of valid ones.9
If Judge Lopez Torres wanted to run a full slate
of delegates and alternates (which the district
court found a credible challenger would need to
do), she needed to enlist nearly 250 people to run,
and secure 124,000 qualified signatures from the
various assembly districts located in Brooklyn and
Staten Island that comprise the Second Judicial
District.10 Accomplishing this would have re-
quired obtaining nearly a quarter million signa-
tures, based on the lower court’s “conservative”
estimate of the number of signatures that must be
collected to ensure obtaining a sufficient number
of valid ones.
Judge Lopez Torres did not attempt to fulfill these
requirements the first two times she sought her
party’s nomination. She hoped instead to secure the
support of local party leaders. Candidates with such
support need not satisfy the ballot access rules on
their own, but rather may rely on party leaders to
make sure that enough delegate candidates qualify
for the primary ballot. The leadership (organized at
the county level by the assembly district leaders) re-
cruits candidates to serve as delegates and alternate
delegates, and enlists petition circulators to obtain
the requisite signatures. These petitions typically in-
clude the leadership’s choices for all the offices that
are at issue in the same primary election cycle.
Party-endorsed slates routinely satisfy the primary
ballot access requirements and typically are the only
ones to do so. When unopposed, the party’s slate is,
under state law, “deemed elected,” and the names
of the delegates never appear on the primary bal-
lot.11
Local party leaders rebuffed Judge Lopez Tor-
res in 2003 when she sought their support, refus-
ing to endorse her explicitly because she had re-
fused to make patronage hires in her civil court
chambers. So the third time Lopez Torres decided
to try for the party’s nomination, she attempted to
secure delegates on her own. She amassed about
30,000 signatures, mostly from eight assembly
districts, which enabled 47 delegates to run on her
behalf. Fifteen of these delegates ran unopposed
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the State of New York, art. II, § 5.
9 N.Y. Elec. L. §§ 6-134 (3) and (4), -136(2)(i), (3); Lopez Tor-
res v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 411 F.Supp.2d 212,
220–221 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
10 See 411 F. Supp. 2d at 219.
11 462 F.3d 161, 174–75 (2d Cir. 2006); N.Y. Elec. L. § 6-160
(2).
in two assembly districts and hence were deemed
elected.12
The remaining 32 delegates Lopez Torres enlisted
ran in contested races. Their names appeared on the
primary ballot, but Lopez Torres’ name did not.
New York law prohibited listing the delegates’ af-
filiation with Judge Lopez Torres. Two of these 32
delegate candidates were elected, giving Judge
Lopez Torres 17 delegates slated to attend the 2003
convention.13
Consider, by contrast, the rules Barack Obama
confronted when he decided to seek the Democra-
tic Party’s nomination. Obama needed to get his
name on the ballot in each state primary or caucus
contest. The process he navigated was a complex
one, governed by a mix of rules promulgated by the
Democratic National Committee (DNC), the re-
spective state Democratic parties, and the legisla-
tures of the states where primaries or caucuses oc-
curred.
The DNC established the overall structure for the
2008 nomination process. It selected a convention
date and location. It decided that primary voters and
caucus participants nationwide would select more
than 3,000 pledged delegates to attend this conven-
tion, apportioned by a formula meant to account
both for population and the degree of past support
for the party in the state. These delegates would be
awarded proportionally to any candidate receiving
at least 15 percent of the vote in each congressional
district. The DNC also created the well-known and
much discussed superdelegates, consisting of party
officials, Democratic Congress members and gov-
ernors, and other prominent Democrats, who would
vote as they chose at the convention.14
Back in August 2006, the DNC called on each
state party to develop and adopt plans that would
govern delegate selection in its state. State party
plans were subject to DNC approval, and needed to
comply with several structural constraints the DNC
imposed. Among these constraints, DNC rules re-
quired that state parties publicize the time and lo-
cation of all official meetings related to delegate se-
lection (including caucuses and conventions); that
they comply with a set calendar and complete their
selection processes no later than June 10, 2008; that
they ensure that the listing of all delegate candidates
on convention, caucus, and primary ballots specify
the presidential candidate they support; and that they
require no more than 5,000 signatures or a fee not
exceeding $2,500 as a precondition to placing the
name of a presidential candidate on the ballot.15
DNC rules also limited participation in the delegate
selection process to voters who “publicly declare or
enroll as Democrats.”16
State parties in turn developed their plans. Thirty-
six state Democratic parties along with those in the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands opted to participate in state-run primaries as
their method to select delegates.17 Several of these
participated in state regimes that were not in full
compliance with DNC requirements. Some state
parties sought waivers from the DNC for noncom-
plying state procedures or pledged to seek legisla-
tive change to bring the State into compliance.18
Others simply participated in noncompliant pri-
maries.
Most famously, the state parties in Florida and
Michigan agreed to participate in state-run primaries
scheduled ahead of the dates permitted by DNC
rules, a decision that led the DNC’s rules commit-
tee first to exclude entirely the delegates selected
and subsequently to allow such delegates to partic-
ipate while halving their vote.19 The DNC chose,
however, not to penalize other state parties that par-
ticipated in noncompliant state regimes. Iowa, New
Hampshire, and South Carolina, for instance, all
held their contests on dates that did not comply with
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14 See Call of the Democratic Convention, Article I, B, I, J,
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Convention.pdf; DNC Delegate Selection Rule 9, 13B. The
precise number of superdelegates was not known until the con-
vention itself, due to demographic changes in the number of of-
ficials eligible for the designation. See Adam Nossiter, Demo-
crat Wins House Seat in Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2008.
15 DNC Delegate Selections Rules 1, 3, 4, 6, 11, 12, 14.A and
B.
16 DNC Delegate Selection Rules 2.A.1.
17 See Delegate Selection Plans (DSP) for the State Democra-
tic Party in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virgin Is-
lands, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin. The Texas Democ-
ratic Party opted into the state regime for the selection of 126
of the state’s pledged delegates, with the remaining 67 selected
in three-tiers of party-run caucuses. See DSP for Texas.
18 See DSP for New York, Tennessee, West Virginia.
19 See Katharine Q. Seelye and Jeff Zeleny, Democrats Approve
Deal on Michigan and Florida, N.Y, TIMES, June 1, 2008.
the ones authorized by the DNC,20 while Virginia
required presidential candidates to obtain 10,000
signatures to qualify for the ballot, notwithstanding
the DNC’s 5,000 signature cap.21
Parties opting to participate in state-run systems
confronted varied levels of state regulation. Some
states played a limited role, paying for the costs to
run the primary and imposing a few general con-
straints, but otherwise letting the state party define
the rules for participation, including how candidates
would qualify for the ballot.22 Other states regulated
the delegate selection process more closely, grant-
ing ballot access to candidates based on factors such
as a national reputation, eligibility for federal match-
ing funds, payment of a fee, obtaining a requisite
number of signatures, or some combination of these
requirements. Where authorized by a state to set bal-
lot access rules, parties participating in state-run pri-
maries imposed relatively modest signature and fee
requirements.23
Fifteen state parties chose not to participate in
state-run systems at all, or in the case of Texas, not
exclusively, and held party-run caucuses typically
on dates that preceded the state-run primaries.24 Bal-
lot access in caucus states generally required noth-
ing more than a request by the candidate for inclu-
sion,25 or payment of a modest fee.26
Operating within this framework, Obama secured
access to the ballot in all fifty states and the partic-
ipating territories.27 The applicable rules qualified
Obama automatically in 29 states based on his sta-
tus as a “national candidate” and his eligibility for
federal matching funds. Obama needed to pay
$28,825 to gain access to the ballot in an additional
seventeen contests. Finally, Obama needed to col-
lect twenty-nine thousand qualifying signatures to
get his name on the ballot in the remaining ten states.
At the close of the process, Obama had secured
1,766.5 pledged delegates, compared with Hillary
Clinton’s 1,639.5.28
All told, Obama confronted ballot access rules
that enabled him to compete meaningfully for the
Democratic presidential nomination. Judge Lopez
Torres faced rules that effectively doomed her ef-
fort to compete for her party’s nomination. DNC
rules ensured that Obama’s name appeared on pri-
mary ballots next to the delegate candidates
pledged to him;29 New York law kept Judge
Lopez Torres’s name off the ballot entirely, and
barred delegate candidates from identifying their
allegiances on the ballot.30 DNC rules mandated
proportional allocation of delegates, allowing
Obama to capture a significant number of dele-
gates even in states where he lost the popular vote;
New York law gave Lopez Torres no similar op-
portunity.
DNC rules, moreover, capped the number of sig-
natures Obama needed to get on the ballot and in
many places rules adopted by states and state par-
ties reduced or eliminated that number entirely.
Even if Obama collected twice the minimum num-
ber required (to ensure a sufficient number would
qualify), he still needed to collect no more than
60,000 signatures nationwide. Lopez Torres, by
contrast, did not come close to collecting the nearly
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20 See DNC Rule 11.A (specifying that the Iowa, Nevada, New
Hampshire, and South Carolina contests “may be held no ear-
lier than” 22 days, 17 days, 14 days, and 7 days, respectively,
prior to the first Tuesday in February). See also Election Guide
2008: Primary Calendar: Democratic Nominating Contests,
N.Y. TIMES, http://politics.nytimes.com/election-guide/2008/
primaries/democraticprimaries/index.html (last access Au-
gust 2, 2008) (reporting dates of actual contests that deviate
from dates set by DNC Rule 11.A: Iowa’s on January 3 rather
than January 14, New Hampshire’s on January 8 not January
22 and not before Nevada’s, and South Carolina’s on January
19 not January 29).
21 Virginia Code § 24.2-545 (10,000 qualified voters, includ-
ing at least 400 qualified voters from each congressional dis-
trict in the Commonwealth, who attest that they intend to par-
ticipate in the Democratic primary).
22 See, e.g., South Carolina Code § 7-11-20.
23 See, e.g., DSP for South Carolina, Title VI, ($2,500 filing
fee or 3,000 signatures); Arizona ($2,500); District of Colum-
bia ($2,500); Louisiana ($375 fee to party after $750 qualify-
ing fee to state).
24 See DSP for Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Washington, Wyoming. The Texas state party opted
both to participate in the state-run primary and hold party-run
caucuses. See Texas DSP. Democratic Parties in American
Samoa and Guam also opted to hold caucuses.
25 See DSP for Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Dakota, Washington.
26 See DSP for Alaska ($1,000); Hawaii ($2,500); Kansas:
($1,000); New Mexico ($2,500).
27 Obama subsequently removed his name from the Michigan
ballot following the DNC’s decision to strip the state of its del-
egates for noncompliance with the primary calendar. Four De-





29 DNC Delegate Selection Rule 12.
30 Lopez Torres v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 411
F.Supp.2d 212, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
250,000 signatures she needed to run a full slate of
loyal delegates and alternates in a single judicial dis-
trict within New York State.
Lobbying convention delegates
Neither Lopez Torres nor Obama won enough
pledged delegates to secure their party’s nomina-
tion. Both accordingly sought to lobby conven-
tion delegates to support their candidacies. Once
again, Obama was successful, Lopez Torres was
not.
New York law does not compel delegates elected
on the leadership’s slate to vote for the leadership’s
candidates. Lopez Torres accordingly sought to per-
suade these delegates to vote for her at the conven-
tion, but, as the district court found, “[t]he structural
and practical impediments” she confronted in this
attempt were “insurmountable.”31
Lopez Torres could not easily identify the del-
egates. During her 2003 attempt at the nomina-
tion, she repeatedly asked the Kings County De-
mocratic Committee to identify the delegates, but
was rebuffed. Even if Lopez Torres knew whom
she needed to contact, New York law gave her
what the appellate court deemed “an unrealisti-
cally brief” period of time in which to contact
them. State law mandates that the party conven-
tion be held two weeks after the judicial delegates
are elected, a period during which Lopez Torres
would have needed to contact and persuade a ma-
jority of the 248 delegates and alternates of the
merits of her case.32
Finally, even if Lopez Torres had sufficient time
to lobby the delegates, she would have failed to
persuade them of anything. The lower courts found
that the delegates slated by the party are not sus-
ceptible to persuasion, that they “do not exercise
their own judgment when deciding which candi-
date to support,” and they “do not actually perform
[a] deliberative, consultative, informed role[].” In-
stead, “without consultation or deliberation, [they]
rubber stamp the county leaders’ choices (or ‘pack-
age’ of choices) for Supreme Court Justice.”33 The
district court explained why: “[The delegates] do
not and will not jeopardize their ongoing, multi-
faceted relationships with other district leaders and
the county leaders over a candidate for Supreme
Court Justice.”34
Barack Obama faced no comparable obstacles
when he sought to lobby delegates to the Demo-
cratic National Convention. DNC rules set the
convention date, and state parties identify their
pledged delegates months before the convention.35
DNC rules, more importantly, identified virtually
all the superdelegates much earlier. These rules
meant Obama could easily identify the delegates
and that he had sufficient time to make his case
to them.
Obama also confronted decisionmakers suscepti-
ble to persuasion. Superdelegate support for Hillary
Clinton might have “seemed like a safe bet” before
the primary season began, but by March, “su-
perdelegates were showing an independence that the
Clinton campaign had not counted on.”36 Both
Obama and Clinton aggressively lobbied the su-
perdelegates, with the media carefully tracking the
ever changing allegiances of this critical group.
Obama’s campaign was able to convince many su-
perdelegates to side with him.
Superdelegates announced their support in public
fora and offered varied reasons for it. Of those en-
dorsing Obama, some said they based their support
on specific traits they thought he possessed, while
others announced they were following the election
returns, either from their district or more gener-
ally.37 These announcements added to Obama’s
tally and influenced other superdelegates to sign on
as well.38
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36 See Katharine Q. Seelye, For Clinton, a Key Group Didn’t
Hold, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2008.
37 See, e.g., Gregory Roberts, Obama Picks Up Another Wash-
ington Superdelegate, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 9,
2008; Julie Bosman, The Superdelegate Tally, June 3, 2008,
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/03/the-su-
perdelegate-tally/index.html?hp; Jeff Zeleny and Patrick
Healy, Black Leader, a Clinton Ally, Tilts to Obama, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008; Loyalty vs. Voters: A Superdelegate’s
Dilemma, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
Id19096400.
38 See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, John Lewis Switches, Theat-
lantic.com, Feb. 15, 2008, http://andrewsullivan.theat-
lantic.com/the_daily_dish/2008/02/john-lewis-swit.html.
Both Obama and Clinton made campaign contri-
butions to various superdelegates.39 These contri-
butions were a matter of public record, but unsur-
prisingly were not among the reasons cited by
superdelegates for their support.
By mid-May, more superdelegates had pledged
their support for Obama than for Clinton.40 By the
day of the last primary, enough superdelegates sided
with Obama to give him the votes he needed to se-
cure the nomination.
The convention
Every four years, delegates to the Democratic Na-
tional Convention select the party’s nominee for the
presidency. In recent years, this convention has been
a four-day affair, televised nationally, attended by
thousands. More than 19,000 people attended the
2008 Denver convention, and Obama accepted the
nomination at Invesco Field in front of more than
80,000 people.
A Democratic convention of a very different sort
selects the party’s nominees for trial judge in New
York’s Second Judicial District. This convention is
held without public disclosure of its time or place,
attendance is limited to the delegates themselves,
and the whole affair is over in a manner of min-
utes.41 The 2002 convention for the Second Judicial
District took place in the main jury room of a Brook-
lyn courthouse during the lunch hour. As one dele-
gate later observed, “You go in, it’s 12 o’clock, and
you are out at 12:30.”42
These conventions differ in almost every respect,
save one. Both conventions dispensed entirely with
deliberation and instead nominated a candidate se-
lected elsewhere. New York’s judicial conventions
are “perfunctory, superficial events . . . [that] rub-
ber stamp the major party leaders’ choices for
Supreme Court Justice.”43 Democratic National
Conventions were once the locus for real decision-
making but today are scripted affairs that approve
but do not select a nominee.44
That the 2008 convention would follow the mod-
ern approach was momentarily uncertain. Senator
Clinton, whose supporters constituted a majority of
the DNC’s Rules and Bylaws Committee, consis-
tently argued that the delegates selected in the
Michigan and Florida primaries should be seated at
the convention, notwithstanding the Committee’s
earlier decision to exclude these delegations for non-
compliance with the DNC’s primary schedule.45 In
May, the Committee voted to seat the delegates but
to halve their voting power, a resolution that did not
give Clinton the boost she needed to fight on after
the Montana and South Dakota primaries on June
3. Had the Committee ruled otherwise, Clinton
might have continued her campaign, perhaps to the
convention floor itself.
No comparable contest would have been possible
in New York. State law requires the party to seat all
delegates elected through the primary process,46
thereby eliminating the prospect of competing or
discredited slates of delegates. This rule—assuming
it is enforceable47—facially protects any delegates
a challenger candidate manages to secure by guar-
anteeing them a seat at the convention. Still, the bal-
lot access rules ensure few such delegates will
emerge from the primary, while the seating mandate
itself eliminates one means for challenger candi-
dates to dispute reported irregularities in the dele-
gate selection process. Thus, even if Lopez Torres
knew, as was later reported, that some of the dele-
gates to the 2002 convention were “technically in-
OBAMA, LOPEZ TORRES, AND THE PATH TO NOMINATION 375
39 See, e.g., Foon Rhee, Key Superdelegate Switches to Obama:
Candidates Contribute to Superdelegates, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 15, 2008.
40 See Jake Tapper, Obama Takes Lead in Superdelegate Tally,
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Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Nelson v. Dean, 528
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eligible” to participate, state law facially precluded
her from challenging their participation at the con-
vention.48
The post-convention period
The convention would seemingly mark the end
of a comparative account of how Obama secured his
party’s nomination and Lopez Torres failed to do
so. And yet, the post-convention periods that fol-
lowed the respective conventions differed signifi-
cantly and did so in a manner that shaped the nom-
inating processes that preceded them. Needless to
say, securing the Democratic Party’s nomination
hardly guaranteed Obama the presidency. The
specter of the general election loomed over the pri-
mary season, with both Senators Obama and Clin-
ton constantly arguing their relative merits not just
against one another, but against the presumptive Re-
publican nominee John McCain.
Not so for the race for trial judge in New York’s
Second Judicial District. Had Judge Lopez Torres
secured her party’s nomination, she would have be-
come a state supreme court justice. The lower courts
in Lopez Torres noted that the general election for
that office plays “almost as minor a role” as does
the convention, and “one-party rule is the norm in
most judicial districts.”49
Lopez Torres unsuccessfully attempted to chal-
lenge one-party rule in 2003. Having failed yet again
to get her party’s nomination, she ran in the general
election with a slate of candidates sponsored by the
Working Families Party. Headlines during the pre-
ceding months highlighted corruption among sitting
Brooklyn Democratic judges and the party leaders
involved with their selection. The New York Times
endorsed Lopez Torres and the slate with which she
ran, calling on voters “to register their disgust with
the hack-infested local bench and the clubhouse-dri-
ven selection process, and . . . [to] elect some good,
politically independent judges.” Lopez Torres and
her fellow candidates lost to the Democrats by a
margin of three to one.50
TWO FACETS 
OF A NOMINATION PROCESS
Obama and Lopez Torres confronted structurally
similar nomination processes that nevertheless dif-
fered in important respects. The process Obama nav-
igated was more penetrable and more contestable
than was the one Lopez Torres traversed. This sec-
tion explores these differences and seeks to explain
why they matter.
Penetrability
Unlike a traditional smoke-filled room, which by
definition is wholly impenetrable to outsiders, the
nomination processes Obama and Lopez Torres
faced expressly invited participation by party mem-
bers. Both candidates accepted the invitation.
Obama encountered a system that allowed for mean-
ingful participation; the one Lopez Torres con-
fronted proved to be impenetrable in practice.
Securing the Democratic Party’s nomination for
the presidency required Obama to navigate scores
of complex electoral rules. This process, while
densely regulated, was nevertheless penetrable. The
ballot access rules enabled Obama to get his name
on primary ballots; the rules governing the alloca-
tion of delegates prevented Obama’s defeat in places
like California from becoming ruinous; and the rules
mandating a lengthy and serialized process ensured
that Obama could effectively lobby delegates and
exploit sequential victories and near-victories.
The rules Obama confronted might well have
been different. More stringent ballot access rules
might have kept Obama’s name off the ballot while
allocating delegates based on a winner-take-all ap-
proach might have ended the Obama candidacy on
Super Tuesday.51 A decision by the DNC early on
to count the Michigan and Florida returns in full (or
never to have excluded them in the first instance)
might well have secured Hillary Clinton’s success.
But the rules were what they were, and they al-
lowed Obama to succeed in critical early battles, re-
main viable through Super Tuesday, and claim fron-
trunner status by late February. Once Obama got
that far, he could not be ignored. Those who ulti-
mately decided the nomination were forced to con-
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front his candidacy, consider him seriously, and ex-
plain their decisions.
Lopez Torres enjoyed no comparable access and
hence received no comparable consideration. As the
district court found, challenger candidates like
Lopez Torres could not “clear all the hurdles nec-
essary to elect supportive delegates.” They con-
fronted “insurmountable” obstacles in seeking to
lobby the delegates elected on the party’s slate.52
Both in design and effect, the New York’s system
was functionally impenetrable.53
The impenetrability of the New York system
helps explain why the delegates to the judicial nom-
inating convention in Brooklyn were not identified
publicly and Lopez Torres could not readily deter-
mine their identities. It was why the delegates them-
selves felt no compulsion to offer any explanation
for their votes and why they proceeded to vote with
virtually no information whatsoever about the peo-
ple they nominated.54 This absence of penetrability
meant the party leaders who actually selected the
nominees the convention ratified had no reason to
offer a public explanation for their decisions—de-
cisions the district court found to be based on the
nominee’s willingness to comply with the party’s
patronage system and to contribute financially to
party leaders.55 In short, party leaders gave no seri-
ous consideration to the candidacy of Judge Lopez
Torres because they had no cause to do so.
Contestability
Following his nomination, Obama faced a gen-
eral election everyone assumed would be competi-
tive. This assumption shaped Obama’s path to the
nomination. All the Democratic candidates in 2008
presented themselves as the best choice to beat the
Republicans in November and the superdelegates
prominently cited this interest in victory when
pledging their support.56
No comparable concern arose in New York’s Sec-
ond Judicial District, where securing the Democra-
tic nomination is tantamount to election as state
supreme court justice. To be sure, no legal obstacle
prevents those aspiring to this office from running
in the general election as an independent or third
party candidate. New York’s requirements for do-
ing so are, in fact, relatively undemanding.57 But re-
ality is something different entirely. Both gerry-
mandering and pure demographics have ensured that
New York’s judicial districts are wholly noncom-
petitive, such that the general election is not a locus
of real decisionmaking. The New York Times ac-
cordingly noted with some surprise Lopez Torres’s
2003 effort to challenge party dominance, headlin-
ing its endorsement of her third party candidacy with
the query: “What’s This? An Actual Judicial Elec-
tion.”58 Turns out, it wasn’t, and Lopez Torres was
routed.
The fact that nomination is tantamount to elec-
tion critically shapes the incentives of the party
leaders who control the nomination process. Where
competitive, the general election functions as a pro-
tective device and imposes a structural constraint on
leadership discretion to select the party nominee.59
It counsels party leaders to consider seriously chal-
lenger candidates, or to ignore them at their peril.
Contestability serves as quality control, creating a
disincentive to select candidates ill-suited for the of-
fice they seek.60
Contestability may exist prior to or indeed in lieu
of a contested general election. A contested nomi-
nation process (be it a primary or convention) may
similarly function to vet candidate qualifications
and ensure accountable decisions. Even a noncom-
petitive nomination process controlled solely by
party leaders may be subject to indirect contest in-
sofar as party members unhappy with the nominees
selected are able to voice their opposition or chal-
lenge the leaders who selected them.
The system Lopez Torres faced was functionally
uncontestable at each of these junctures. The gen-
eral election was a rubber stamp, while burdensome
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ballot access law left most primaries uncontested.
The very existence of the state-run primary system,
moreover, distracted attention from the control party
leaders exerted and rendered more difficult an in-
ternal contest of the leadership role in the process.
The lack of contestability helps explain the per-
sistence of New York’s judicial nominating process.
Good government groups have long complained
about the system, editorial boards have demanded
reform, and criminal indictments have periodically
highlighted the corruption the system facilitates.61
The Lopez Torres litigation itself, with its multiple
opinions from three courts, offered a scathing cri-
tique of the State’s system. Justice Stevens went so
far as to suggest that New York’s system was “stu-
pid.”62 While many (including all nine justices)
have defended the regime’s legality, and some
praised its purported ancillary benefits,63 absent
throughout has been vigorous internal debate about
the merits of the system.64
Contrast this system with the DNC’s nomination
process and the vigorous debate it generated among
party leaders, party members, and observers gener-
ally. Some praised the superdelegates’ indepen-
dence;65 others celebrated their role in ending the
process by June, thereby providing a clear winner
in a close race.66 Those unhappy with the power
DNC rules gave to the superdelegates complained,
blogged, and voted;67 some threatened defection,
some may have defected, and some promised retal-
iation against those superdelegates holding elective
office.68 In this highly contested regime, voice was
readily implemented, exit even more easily exer-
cised.
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
SMOKE-FILLED ROOM
The Supreme Court in Lopez Torres never ques-
tioned the district court’s finding that New York’s
system was functionally both impenetrable and un-
contestable. In fact, the decision reads as if the Court
would have upheld the New York regime no mat-
ter how impenetrable or uncontestable it was. Nar-
rower holdings were available,69 but a more cir-
cumscribed approach would have invited future
challenges to other smoke-filled rooms. The Court
bluntly stated that it was unwilling to extend that in-
vitation.70 Perhaps envisioning lawsuits brought by
disgruntled Democratic voters unhappy with the su-
perdelegates, Justice Scalia insisted that the Court
was ill-suited to distinguish among smoke-filled
rooms.71
On this point, Justice Scalia sounded a lot like
Justice Frankfurter, who famously pressed a similar
argument in Baker v. Carr and lost.72 The Court, of
course, has never quite overcome that nagging sus-
picion that Frankfurter may have been right and that
Baker launched a foray into the political thicket that
might wisely have been avoided.73 The Court’s def-
erential posture in Lopez Torres reflects this suspi-
cion.
This unwillingness, while welcomed by some,74
is cause for concern. Bright lines distinguishing one
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complex nomination process from another may
prove elusive, but that difficulty alone does not
mean meaningful distinctions are either impossible
or unnecessary. Nor does it suggest that this arena
presents questions that are categorically different
from other knotty subjects with which the Court has
long engaged.75 Some distinctions will prove more
lasting than others, but drawing them case by case
is a staple of what the Court has long done and what
it should continue to do.
In Lopez Torres, moreover, the Court did not so
much refuse to enter a new arena as retreat from one
it had long regulated. Unlike Baker or other, more
recent manifestations of the question,76 Lopez Tor-
res did not require the Court to break wholly new
ground. The Justices have long engaged in consti-
tutional review of state-mandated nomination pro-
cesses and long recognized that such processes im-
plicate protected participatory and associational
interests.77 To be sure, not every foray into this
realm has been adequately theorized78 and some
might well be reconsidered.79 But the legal land-
scape governing nomination processes has long re-
flected the Court’s involvement and withdrawal
now leaves standing an incomplete and skewed reg-
ulatory regime.
New York, of course, might have dispensed with
primaries entirely, and it might have left the conven-
tions that followed unregulated. Instead, the State
chose to adopt a hybrid nomination process that both
grants the right to vote in primary elections and man-
dates—and in important respects directs—the con-
ventions that follow. Once it chose to do this, consti-
tutional obligations attached.80 Or at least they should
have. The Court in Lopez Torres expressed surprising
skepticism on this point. At oral argument, for exam-
ple, Chief Justice Roberts said he thought “it seem[ed]
kind of odd, that if a State can have no role for vot-
ers, it can have a pure convention, that they’re penal-
ized if they have some role for voters?”81 That a
greater power does not necessarily encompass the
lesser should hardly have been surprising.82
The Court’s retreat in Lopez Torres is, moreover,
incomplete. Leaving disputes of this sort to the po-
litical process has undeniable allure, but Lopez Tor-
res fails to secure this result. The decision invites
party leaders to enlist and rely on state law as the
primary vehicle for party governance, largely re-
lieving these leaders of any need to secure the sup-
port or acquiescence of party members to a chosen
course. Why bother to persuade party members to
adopt or accept a rule when the legislature will man-
date it as a matter of law? Furthermore, placing what
appears to be constitutional significance on the lit-
igating positions of the state parties,83 the Court
privileged the party machines in a manner that guar-
antees litigation. Should party leaders fail to get
what they want from the legislature, they will sue,
claiming the undesired outcome amounts to a denial
of associational freedom.84
Lopez Torres accordingly does what a prominent
proponent of judicial restraint in this realm has
counseled against: it gives party organizations a
constitutional position “that immunizes them from
the results of the give-and-take” of the political pro-
cess, and thereby favors “unaccountable and gener-
ally obscure party officials.”85 Associational inter-
ests may be understood in such terms, to be sure,
but whether they remain worth protecting once they
are is another matter.
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A more sound approach would embrace substan-
tive review of state-mandated nomination pro-
cesses,86 while expressly recognizing that regimes
that vest power in party leaders differ in important
ways. Lines are needed, and some will be difficult
to draw, but manageable and discernible distinctions
may indeed be made.
Comparing Obama’s success with Lopez Torres’s
failure shows how. The nominating process Obama
traversed was more penetrable and more contestable
than was the one Lopez Torres confronted. Pene-
trability and contestability matter here not because
they are constitutionally mandated—they most def-
initely are not. Instead, they function much like the
role district shape plays in the redistricting context;
they signal something may be awry and that closer
scrutiny is appropriate.87 The degree to which a
nominating regime is penetrable and contestable of-
fers a means to gauge the health and vibrancy of the
associational and participatory interests of the par-
ticipants within it. Making assessments of this sort
case by case is something the Court has long done,
and something it should continue to do.
A CURE WORSE THAN THE DISEASE?
THE SPECIAL CASE OF 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
The Justices have long been uneasy with the prac-
tice of electing judges.88 This uneasiness was man-
ifest in Lopez Torres not in a criticism of the sys-
tem plaintiffs challenged, but rather as apprehension
about what might follow were the Justices to affirm
the lower courts. The district court had already or-
dered the State to hold direct primaries until the state
legislature came up with a constitutional replace-
ment for the invalidated regime.89 The Justices wor-
ried that this remedy was both worse than the prac-
tice it replaced and that it might become permanent.
In concurring opinions, Justice Stevens queried
whether “the very practice of electing judges is un-
wise,”90 while Justice Kennedy wondered whether
judicial elections that require candidates “to conduct
campaigns and to raise funds” damaged “the per-
ception and the reality of judicial independence.”91
At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts observed
that a purely appointive system was “not a realistic
option,” after which Justice Ginsburg recalled that
a commission studying judicial elections in New
York concluded that “the worst thing in the world
would be to return us to the primary system this sys-
tem was intended to replace.”92 Justice Breyer, for
his part, said that if counsel for Lopez Torres
thought the challenged system was “so terrible . . .
[that] the Constitution forbids that, . . . you’d have
to explain, wouldn’t you, why, with all its faults,
that is not better in the judgment of New York than
a system where people raised $4 million from the
lawyers in order to run for office?”93
Needless to say, no such explanation was re-
quired, nor was any of this speculation about judi-
cial elections even relevant. The hybrid system New
York employed to nominate judicial candidates was
either unconstitutional or it was not. Given that can-
didates for judicial office may lawfully be selected
by direct primary, what New York might (or might
not) do had the Court invalidated the challenged sys-
tem was, as a matter of law, beside the point.
And yet, for many of the Justices it appeared to
be the point that mattered most. It distracted them
and may well have colored their view of the mer-
its. Justice Stevens, for example, seemed to think
the “glaring deficiencies” the district court found to
inhere in New York’s system lent support “to the
broader proposition that the very practice of elect-
ing judges is unwise.”94 Judge Gleeson’s findings,
however, did no such thing. The “glaring deficien-
cies” he identified—and there were many95—were
those that characterize a classic patronage system,
and not those typically associated with judicial elec-
tions. He identified, for instance, questionable con-
tributions given not to judicial candidates to skew
future litigation, but by such candidates to local
party bosses to safeguard nominations.96 Judge
Gleeson’s findings lend support not for the claim
that electing judges is unwise, but instead for the
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proposition that New York’s judicial elections are
not really elections at all.
Many of the Justices seemed to think that might
just be a good thing. New York’s judicial nominat-
ing regime is a mess, to be sure. But for all the dif-
ficulties it presents, it appeared more palatable to a
Court squeamish about judicial candidates actively
soliciting cash in order to finance a campaign and
making the promises candidates seeking election
make.97 A little backroom decisionmaking might
seem a small price to pay to temper such conduct.
Lopez Torres nevertheless made no effort to limit
its analysis to judicial elections.98 It immunized every
smoke-filled room from review, not just the ones that
select judicial candidates. The Obama-Clinton con-
test shows that not all of these rooms stunt political
participation and prevent an election from being a
“real” election. But some smoke-filled rooms do
stymie democratic engagement, and it was this effect
that the Court in Lopez Torres sought to encourage.
CONCLUSION
In his concurring opinion in Lopez Torres, Jus-
tice Kennedy expressed considerable discomfort
with the practice of electing judges, and closed by
wondering whether it might all be otherwise. He
contemplated judicial elections of a sort that “of-
fer[ed] the opportunity, indeed the civic obligation,
for voters and the community as a whole to become
engaged in the legal process.” He imagined that “fair
and open” judicial elections might even function “as
an essential forum for society to discuss and define
those attributes of judicial excellence and to find
ways to discern those qualities in the candidates.”99
Pie in the sky perhaps, but still not a bad aspira-
tion—not just for judicial elections but for all elec-
tions that select public officers. Justice Kennedy
suggested implementing his vision would require
wide participation from the “organized bar, the le-
gal academy, public advocacy groups, a principled
press, and all the other components of functioning
democracy.”100 He omitted the Court itself from this
list of participants. He should have included it and
recognized it as an essential “component of func-
tioning democracy.” The Court’s biggest mistake in
Lopez Torres was its refusal to embrace this role,
whatever the outcome produced.
Last June’s decision in Caperton v. Massey sug-
gests that some Justices may be willing to rethink
this stance. Caperton read the Due Process Clause
to require the recusal of an elected judge who had
received a disproportionately large campaign con-
tribution from a party involved in litigation before
him. Caperton relies on a fact-intensive inquiry that
insists that courts can meaningfully distinguish per-
missible campaign contributions from impermissi-
ble ones in this context. Vigorous dissents objected
with language that echoed the institutional concerns
voiced by the unanimous Court in Lopez Torres. 
Perhaps Caperton signals a change in direction and
the Court will begin to review with rigor not only
contribution disputes but challenges to nomination
procedures of the sort brought by Judge Lopez Torres.
Embracing this role would be a welcome develop-
ment. Doing so hardly requires the Court to eradicate
every nomination process that relies on backroom
decisionmaking. Many co-exist with and even facil-
itate the sort of democratic participation to which Jus-
tice Kennedy suggests we should all aspire. One
might even argue that the nomination process Obama
traversed—with the superdelegates controlling the
nomination and the very institutions Justice Kennedy
identified actively engaged in their evaluation—came
pretty close to realizing the aspiration. But even if it
fell short, this smoke-filled room holds far more
promise than the one that dominates in New York,
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